In this volume, the philosophical writings of Stephen Turner on social science and the social are examined critically in essays by major scholars in philosophy and sociology from all over Europe and the United States. The topics covered include his intellectual trajectory and issues over the concepts of practices, the belief-desire model of action explanation, normativity, and collectivities.
These issues form the core of the philosophy of social science and are central to the history of the social sciences. In addition, there are substantive discussions of the relation of cognitive science to economics and Weber, of ethnography, and of the legacy of Talcott Parsons.
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Delete Cancel Save. Cancel Save. View Expanded. View Table. Stepney, Reginald P. Repository Usage Stats. More Info. Login Register. View Usage Statistics. But it refers, as well, to the feedback effects that the functioning of a normative order produce upon the order itself, bringing about constant change and adjustment according to the needs of action.
On the other hand, governance of practice refers to forms of governance which are more directly related to the reflexive dimension of practices.
It denotes these normative practices by which a normative order is directly addressed. Will sees normativity- as-governance as a distributed feature of social life.
Human beings are normative through and through, and normative regulation is a mark of any social practice. This stands in contrast to most normative theories, which prioritize rational justification, regarded as the quintessential normative practice, trumping any other practice having normative import. Whereas Will understands rational justification as but one among plural forms of governance, all having the same goal, which is the production of regulatory effects.
Most governance activities tacitly unfold in the background, without much notice, as activities serving stabilizing and regulative functions. To this end, they develop structured patterns, a deep web of interlocking forms of adjustment activities and regularity having an eminently normative function that yields small but constant revisionary consequences in the order it-self. It is through this flow of tiny but regular adjustments that the order generally preserves its legitimacy.
Normativity in the broad sense just described as tacit upkeep encompasses every aspect of human life. Norms tacitly govern the whole of our experience, and governance is all-embracing. That is why Will argues that normative reflection is an activity mostly concerned with adjustment and repair, unfolding in the interstices, as it were, in the manifold connections between the need for action and the answers or action worked out in response to such needs.
Taken together, these themes give shape to the idea of normativity as a shared and distributed property of the ordinary. The historical references evoked in this paper show that none of these themes is really new.
Whilst the focus on tacit presuppositions has been a common feature of a large array of 20th century philosophies, and whilst social interaction has similarly been reclaimed by a large spectrum of social theories, the third and the fourth theme have certainly been less intensively exploited — at least in philosophy. But the major philosophical value this project has to offer emerges from the joint consideration of these four conceptual factors and from the consequent adoption of an interdisciplinary strategy which this consideration requires.
Indeed, each of them articulates, in its own manner, the idea that normativity is embedded within everyday life as one of its constitutive and irreducible traits. They articulate the idea that the human being is a normative creature in the sense that a critical capacity for justification, critique, and other normative practices is a necessary ingredient of our human constitution.
An attitude toward accountability is built into the fabric of social life as a necessary precondition for the success of any form of social intercourse, from the most simple forms of social interaction to the most complex forms of institutional normative governance. In this sense, the sources of normativity seem to lie in sociality rather than in reason. Normativity is, so to speak, not only deeply social — a fact few would contest today — but deeply embedded in the structure of ordinary life.
If we accept the general traits of this still incomplete account of the normative creature, we can find a way out of some of the recent difficulties in moral and political philosophy. A pragmatic approach based upon a widened understanding of normativity can provide theoretically fruitful tools for setting up a new agenda for understanding normativity. This approach a privileges the social over the individual as the primary source of normativity society-centered approach , b acknowledges the normatively binding force of practices practice-based approach , and c relies upon empirical evidence to explain the functioning of normative practices in ways much more sustained than have been done so far multidisciplinary approach.
The first is a focus upon the interplay of norms and actions which provides the methodological and conceptual framework for a multidisciplinary approach engaging human and social sciences and philosophy on a non-reductionist basis. The second is the adoption of the perspective of the situated agent in normative theory which is necessary to overcome the shortcomings of reductive individualistic accounts. The third is the definition of normative practices through reference to their regulative function in the dynamic interplay of agents with environments.
The fourth is that norms and values are defined in accordance with a fallibilistic and experimental epistemology. The fifth is the priority assigned to empirical over conceptual analysis and to the history of social processes over the history of ideas in processes of critique and justification.
The sixth is the priority of non-ideal theory over ideal theory. Austin J. Brandom R. Camic C. Cefai D. Goffman, Comment se conduire dans les lieux publics.
Collins R. Darwall S. Craig ed. Dewey J. Dorf M. Dupret B. Emirbayer M. Frega R. A Pragmatist Account, Lanham, Lexington. Peirce Society, 48, 4, Gamson W. Garfinkel H. Gaus G. Giddens A. Goffman E. Habermas J. Hartmann M. Honneth A. Horkheimer M. Kitcher P. Korbut P. Korsgaard C. Lakoff G. Laugier S. Laugier eds. Perreau eds.
Levine S. Lumsden S. Rawls A. Vaisey eds. Rawls J. Rouse J. Schatzki T. Schubert H. Hollstein, Bettina und Jung eds. Smith S. Sullivan S. Turner S. Will F. Therefore, I will be concerned neither with epistemic nor with semantic normativity. Epistemic normativity has to do with the conditions of validity of assertions dealing with states of affairs, whereas semantic normativity deals with the conditions for the correct and incorrect use of linguistic expressions. Practical normativity deals with the ways in which we treat ourselves and — especially — other human beings, and, by extension, what belongs to them, what expresses their identity.
For a complete discussion of this point, see Rawls and issue 9, 4, of the Journal of Classical Sociology , edited by A. Rawls and entirely devoted to this theme. See in particular Frega See notably Habermas Gamson , it is important to note also its constitutive role in the production of the social bond, by putting social interaction and mutual interdependence at the very root of social situation.
Constraining power, vulnerability, and mutual interdependence are, therefore, three distinct but inseparable dimensions of the normative constitution of ordinary life, according to Goffman. See Collins Among the rare philosophers having explored the philosophical implications of these approaches, it is notably within critical theory that the work of Garfinkel and Goffman have had some influence.
See in particular Habermas , McCarthy , and Celikates
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